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Abstract
Theories of social preferences assume that individuals have a utility over monetary outcome
profiles, that depends on their and other players’ payments. Behavior in strategic interactions is
explained as a Nash equilibrium of the game where final payoffs are paid in these utility units.
These theories predict the estimated preferences to be independent of the subject’s position in the
game if in the experiment the allocation to a role is randomly determined, since subjects in each
role have the same preferences ex-ante. We test and reject this hypothesis. We use the Quantal
Response Equilibrium (QRE) of McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) to study first mover behavior in the
Trust game. As standard in this literature we assume that first mover beliefs are consistent with
the observed probability distribution of actions of the second movers. On the other hand, second
mover behavior can be extrapolated without any a priori rational expectation assumptions. Our
results show that the estimated preferences of first movers attach a significantly higher weight to
their own payoff compared to the weight attached by second movers on their own payoff. This
finding is inconsistent with the assumption that subjects approach a game with the same (that
is, independent of the allocation to roles in the game) ex-ante preferences over monetary outcome
profiles.
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1 Introduction
Since the work of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Charness and Rabin (2002) there has been an
increased interest amongst researchers in extending their models to a variety of applications
in order to explain agents’ behavior. Although these venues are interesting and promising,
one can only wonder if such interpretations constitute true depictions of subjects’ preferences.
Our objective in this study is to examine the empirical validity of a specific class of utility
functions that has been used extensively in the literature to model social preferences. In its
general form, an agent maximizes a weighted sum of his own payoff and the payoff of his
match. A logical implication of the model of social preferences is that the estimated utility
functions of individuals are independent of the order of play of a randomized sample. We test
this assumption on experimental data and reject it.
In our experiment, a pair of subjects play the standard Trust game. One subject has the
role of the first mover in the game, and the other subject has the role of the second mover.
The first mover is initially given an endowment and is asked to specify a transfer to the second
mover. Any amount that is not transferred to the second mover is secured as payment by the
first mover. On the other hand, the transfer is multiplied by a factor, f > 1, before reaching
the second mover who then has to decide on how to allocate the new amount. The subjects
play the Trust game for a number of rounds. In each round, the subjects are matched with a
different participant with the order of play determined by a random draw.
We posit a structural model to estimate the utility functions. First, we apply logistic re-
sponse functions so that better responses are more likely to be observed than worse responses.
We then use our experimental dataset to derive parameters using maximum likelihood es-
timation. Extrapolating second movers’ behavior requires no a priori rational expectation
assumptions. On the contrary, extrapolating behavioral information on first movers requires
assumptions on their rationality. As an example, consider the following linear model to de-
scribe the behavior of player A (first mover) in a two-person response game. Player A’s utility
function is represented by
uA(piA, piB) = wB · E[piB] + (1− wB) · E[piA],
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where player B is the responder (second mover). The monetary payoffs of player A and player
B are denoted by piA and piB, respectively. Furthermore, the weight that player A places on B’s
payoff is wB. Notice that at the time when player A decides on a choice, cannot foresee how
the responder will respond to the choice made. Naturally, the payoffs that are incorporated
into player A’s utility function are based on expectation. As Charness and Rabin (2002) note,
“interpreting A’s behavior is problematic, since A’s perceived consequences of his choice depend
on his beliefs about what B will do.” (p. 834)
In the present study, we estimate parameter values for first mover behavior using the Quantal
Response Equilibrium (QRE) of McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) which maintains the assumption
of equilibrium in that beliefs are statistically accurate. QRE can be viewed as an extension
of standard random utility models of discrete (“quantal”) choice to strategic settings. Under
this process best response functions become probabilistic. Much recent work has shown that
QRE can rationalize behavior in a variety of experimental settings including alternating-offer
bargaining (Goeree and Holt (2000)), coordination games (Anderson, Goeree, and Holt (2001)),
the traveler’s dilemma (Capra, Goeree, Gomez, and Holt (1999), Goeree and Holt (2001)), all-
pay and first-price auctions (Anderson, Goeree, and Holt (1998), Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey
(2002)).
We find that first movers attach a significantly higher weight on their own payoff compared
to the weight second movers attach on their own payoff. Thus, the preference characteristics
of subjects are not stable but depend on the order of play. Yet, preferences should be immune
to the position of the subject in the game. If a change in the agent’s order in the game
reveals different behavioral characteristics, then these characteristics cannot be interpreted as
preferences. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the experimental design
is presented. In Section 3, we specify the structural model and the estimation techniques. In
Section 4, we report and discuss the important findings. In Section 5, we offer our concluding
remarks.
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2 Experimental Design
The experimental sessions consisted of two stages. In the first stage, the subjects had to play
the Trust game for 15 rounds. The number of rounds to come was not communicated to the
subjects. In each round, the subjects had to face a different participant. In the second stage,
the subjects were asked to complete a questionnaire. With the conclusion of the experimental
session, the subjects were privately paid their earnings in cash.
The Trust game consists of two players. One subject has the role of the first mover and
the other subject has the role of the second mover. Let m ∈ {1, 2} index the order of the
mover, where m = 1 denotes the first mover, and m = 2 denotes the second mover. The
subjects’ roles were determined by random assignment. The first mover was initially given
an endowment of 4 quarters and was asked to specify an integer amount of quarters, between
zero and 4 quarters inclusive, to transfer to the second mover. Any quarters that were not
transferred to the second mover were secured as profit for the first mover. Denote the amount
of quarters transferred as x ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}. The amount transferred was multiplied by 4 before
reaching the second mover; that is, the second mover received 4x quarters for a transfer x. The
second mover was then asked to allocate the new amount. Let y ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} be the choice
of the second mover. Notice that the second mover, regardless of the first mover’s transfer,
had always to choose from a set of five alternatives. Thus, our experimental design secured
that changes in the estimated parameters across movers were not affected by the cardinality
of the choice set as both, first movers and second movers, had five choices to select from. Let
pim denote the payoff of mover m in quarters for any transfer x and choice y. The payoff of
the second mover is given by pi2(x, y) = (y − 1) × x, whereas the payoff of the first mover is
given by pi1(x, y) = 3x + 4 − pi2(x, y). The choices together with the corresponding allocation
of quarters between the second mover and the first mover, were indicated on the subjects’
computer screens as well as mentioned explicitly in the experimental instructions. The round
was completed with the earnings of the subject for the specific round indicated on the screen
along with the cumulative earnings of the subject thus far in the game.
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There were 16 subjects in each experimental session. We conducted 6 sessions in total in May
of 2010 at the campus of Florida State University. The experimental sessions were conducted
in the XSFS computer lab of the Florida State University in May of 2010. The subjects were
recruited from the undergraduate population of the Florida State University using an electronic
recruitment system. Participants were allowed to participate in only one session. Each session
lasted approximately 45 minutes. The experiments were programmed and conducted with the
use of the experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher (2007)). The detailed instructions are
reported in the Supplementary Appendix.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics on the raw experimental data. In particular, Panel A
presents the frequency of the transfer and the choice variables. 35% of first movers chose to
transfer 0 quarters to second movers. Transfer-amounts of 1 quarter and 3 quarters were the
least chosen by the first movers. Furthermore, only 36.7% of the first movers transferred more
than half of their endowment to second movers. On the other hand, 57.7% of second movers
kept the entire allowable amount, whereas only 24.4% selected one of choices y = 2, 3. In Panel
B, we show how the distribution of each choice y changes with the first mover’s transfer. With
the exception of 6 observations at choice y = 2 (for a transfer x = 4), all other observations
for transfers greater than 1 quarter were allocated to choices y = 3, 4, 5. When first movers
transferred only one quarter, then 100% of the second movers chose to keep the entire amount.
The percentage of second movers keeping the entire allowable amount remained high at 42.9%,
60%, and 48.3% for transfers x = 2, 3, 4, respectively.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Transfers and Choices
Panel A
Transfer x Freq. Percent Choice y Freq. Percent
0 252 35.0 1 0 0.0
1 78 10.8 2 6 1.3
2 126 17.5 3 108 23.1
3 90 12.5 4 84 18.0
4 174 24.2 5 270 57.7
Total 720 468
Panel B
Distribution of Choice y
yx 1 2 3 4
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
1 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
2 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 6 3.5
3 0 0.0 42 33.3 24 26.7 42 24.1
4 0 0.0 30 23.8 12 13.3 42 24.1
5 78 100.0 54 42.9 54 60.0 84 48.3
Notes: In Panel A, we provide the frequencies and percentages of each transfer and choice amount. The choice
of amount kept is conditional on a transfer x > 0. In Panel B, we provide the frequencies and percentages of
choices for each transfer amount x.
3 Structural Model
We posit next a specific class of utility functions that has been used extensively in the lit-
erature to model agents’ social preferences. Our specification does not impose any a priori
restrictions on the weights and consequently on preferences. Thus, we remain agnostic if order
affects weights. We then lay out our hypotheses to determine if the model can capture social
preferences. Finally, we specify the estimation techniques.
3.1 Model Specification
We describe first the utility function of the first mover and then the utility function of the second
mover. A first mover makes a choice of transfer x ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} without knowing beforehand
what the second mover will choose. Naturally, the payoffs that are incorporated into the utility
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function are based on the first mover’s expectation over payoffs. More specifically, let the utility
function of the first mover be
u1j(x) = v
1(x) + j(x) = (1− w1) · E[pi1(x, y)|x] + w1 · E[pi2(x, y)|x] + j(x). (1)
In this specification, the utility of a first mover j is separated into a value that is common
across all subjects v1(x) and an idiosyncratic preference shock j. The parameter of interest w
1
is the weight a first mover j assigns to the payoff of the second mover. In addition, we assume
that the idiosyncratic preference shocks are identically and independently drawn from a Type
I extreme value distribution. Denote, next, the first mover’s belief on the probability of the
second mover choosing y given a transfer x, as ρ(y|x). Thus, the expected payoff of the first
and second movers for a given transfer x is
E[pim(x, y)|x] =
5∑
y=1
ρ(y|x)pim(x, y) for m = 1, 2.
Proof. The expected payoff of the second mover follows directly. The expected payoff of the
first mover is
E[pi1(x, y)|x] = 3x+ 4−
5∑
y=1
ρ(y|x)pi2(x, y).
Given that
∑5
y=1 ρ(y|x) = 1 we get
E[pi1(x, y)|x] =
5∑
y=1
ρ(y|x)(3x+ 4)−
5∑
y=1
ρ(y|x)pi2(x, y)
=
5∑
y=1
ρ(y|x)(3x+ 4− pi2(x, y))
=
5∑
y=1
ρ(y|x)pi1(x, y).

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The choice probability of the first mover choosing transfer x = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 is therefore
P1(x) =
exp(v1(x))∑4
k=0 exp(v
1(k))
. (2)
On the other hand, the utility function of a second mover i has the functional form
u2i (x, y) = v
2(x, y) + εi(x, y) = (1− w2) · pi2(x, y) + w2 · pi1(x, y) + εi(x, y). (3)
Parallel to the first mover’s utility specification, the second mover’s utility function consists of a
value that is common across all subjects v2(x, y) and an idiosyncratic preference shock εi. The
common value v2(x, y) can be divided further into a subject i’s own payoff pi2 and the paired
first mover’s payoff pi1. The parameter of interest w2 is the weight a second mover i assigns
to the payoff of the first mover. In addition, the idiosyncratic preference shocks are identically
and independently drawn from a Type I extreme value distribution. The latter assumption
yields the convenient logit choice specification
P2(y|x) = exp(v
2(x, y))∑5
k=1 exp(v
2(x, k))
∀y ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. (4)
Our specification does not impose any a priori assumptions on the weights placed on the first
and second movers. Yet, if the model properly addresses social preferences, then the weights
should on average be equal regardless of the order of move. Recall that our experimental
design imposes a random draw on the order of subjects in each period. Therefore, if indeed
social preferences determine behavior in a Nash Equilibrium way, and preferences are, in fact,
recovered from subjects’ observed actions, then, we should expect that, on average, the same
subject-characteristics are observed. Given this insight, we formulate our testable hypotheses
next. Our null hypothesis is that the model can explain both, first and second mover behavior
in the Trust game. That is, the weights assigned by first and second movers to their own payoffs
are statistically the same; or equivalently, the weights placed by first and second movers on the
other movers’ payoffs are statistically the same. The alternative hypothesis is that the weights
assigned to their own payoffs are not statistically the same.
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NULL HYPOTHESIS: w1 = w2
ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESIS: w1 6= w2
Accepting the null hypothesis would provide evidence to support the specific linear utility
function used to model social preferences in the Trust game. Otherwise, rejecting the null
hypothesis would qualify us to reject the specific linear utility function as one that captures
social preferences in the Trust game. We detail our approach of estimating the weights next.
3.2 Estimation Technique
Our estimation techniques require the use of maximum likelihood to estimate the parameters
w1 and w2. Recall that the choice probability of first movers is given by (2), that is
P1(x|w1) = exp((1− w
1) · E[pi1(x, y)|x] + w1 · E[pi2(x, y)|x])∑4
k=0 exp((1− w1) · E[pi1(k, y)|k] + w1 · E[pi2(k, y)|k])
.
To calculate the expected payoffs, we allow two alternative specifications of the first mover’s
beliefs ρ(y|x). The first specification ensures that the beliefs of first movers are consistent with
the observed probability distribution as posited by the QRE model; that is, ρ(y|x) = ny|x
nx
,
where nx is the observed number of occurrences of some transfer x, and ny|x is the number
of observed occurrences of choice y given a transfer x. The second specification depends on
the estimated probability, as predicted by the model, so that ρ(y|x) = P2(y|x,w2∗). The two
approaches indicated are the ones commonly used to specify ρ(y|x). To ensure robustness for
different specifications, we test our model using both approaches.
The likelihood function is then
L1 =
∏
x
P1(x|w1)nx ,
and the log-likelihood function is
L˜1 =
∑
x
nx logP1(x|w1).
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Thus, we calculate w1∗ so as to maximize the above likelihood function.
On the other hand, the choice probability of second movers is
P2(y|x,w2) = exp((1− w
2) · pi2(x, y) + w2 · pi1(x, y))∑5
k=1 exp((1− w2) · pi2(x, k) + w2 · pi1(x, k))
Suppose we observe ny|x occurrences of choice y given transfer x; then, the likelihood function
is
L2 =
∏
x
∏
y
P2(y|x,w2)ny|x ,
and the log-likelihood function is
L˜2 =
∑
x
∑
y
ny|x logP2(y|x,w2).
We calculate w2∗ so as to maximize the above likelihood function.
4 Results
In this section, we present the important results and discuss their implications. In estimating the
first mover’s weight, w1, we allow for two alternative specifications of beliefs, ρ(y|x). Henceforth,
Model 1 refers to the case where ρ(y|x) = P2(y|x,w2∗) and Model 2 refers to the case where
ρ(y|x) = ny|x/nx. The estimates are presented below for both models. The standard errors of
the estimates are reported in parentheses.
Model 1 : v1(x) = 0.119
(0.0131)
· E[pi2(x, y)|x] + 0.881
(0.0131)
· E[pi1(x, y)|x]
Model 2 : v1(x) = 0.018
(0.0132)
· E[pi2(x, y)|x] + 0.982
(0.0132)
· E[pi1(x, y)|x]
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In the estimation, we impose that the sum of the weights placed on the first and second
mover’s payoff equals one. In Model 1, we find that a first mover, on average, attaches a weight
w1∗ = 0.119 on the payoff of the respective second mover and 1 − w1∗ = 0.881 on his own
payoff. The standard error of the estimate is 0.0131. In addition, the weight w1∗ is significantly
different from zero at a 99% level. In Model 2, we find that a first mover, on average, attaches
a weight w1∗ = 0.018 on the payoff of the respective second mover and 1− w1∗ = 0.982 on his
own payoff. The standard error of the estimate is 0.0132, but the weight w1∗ is not significantly
different from zero.
In Table 2, we present the model fit of the first mover’s choice probability P1(x|w1∗). In the
case of Model 1, the model estimate misses a large proportion of subjects who choose x = 0.
Additionally, the model overestimates the proportion of subjects who choose x = 1. This is
because P2(y|x,w2∗) underestimates second mover’s probability of choosing to keep all quarters
when the transfer is only 1 quarter. In contrast, Model 2 corrects for the problems of Model 1
and thus the fit improves. Regardless of the model choice, it is evident that first movers attach
almost no weight to a second mover’s payoff.
Table 2: First Mover Choice Probability P1(x): Model Predictions vs Data
Transfer Model 1 Model 2 Data
x=0 12.1% 29.3% 35.0%
x=1 25.6% 11.8% 10.8%
x=2 28.5% 27.1% 17.5%
x=3 21.0% 13.1% 12.5%
x=4 12.7% 18.7% 24.2%
Notes: We present the model fit of the first mover’s choice probability. Model 1 assumes that ρ(y|x) =
P2(y|x,w2∗) and Model 2 assumes that ρ(y|x) = ny|x/nx.
On the other hand, for second movers, the estimated weight, w2∗, is 0.354 with a standard
error of 0.053. Thus, the utility of the second mover is
v2(x, y) = 0.354
(0.053)
· pi1(x, y) + 0.646
(0.053)
· pi2(x, y),
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which implies that second movers attach a strictly positive weight to a first mover’s payoff. The
estimated parameters are, at a 99% level, significantly different from zero. The estimation of
w2∗ allows us to approximate the second movers’ conditional choice probabilities P2(y|x,w2∗).
We compare this estimated choice probability with the actual observed probability ny|x/nx in
Table 3. We see from Table 3 that the model does a fairly good job in matching data except
for the case of x = 1, where all subjects choose an amount kept of y = 5.
Table 3: Second Mover Choice Probability P(y|x,w2∗): Model Prediction vs Data
Transfer (x)
x=1 x=2 x=3 x=4
Amount-Kept (y) Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data
y=1 11.4% 0.0% 5.8% 0.0% 2.7% 0.0% 1.2% 0.0%
y=2 14.6% 0.0% 9.6% 0.0% 5.7% 0.0% 3.2% 3.4%
y=3 18.8% 0.0% 15.8% 33.3% 12.1% 26.7% 8.6% 24.1%
y=4 24.1% 0.0% 26.0% 23.8% 25.5% 13.3% 23.4% 24.1%
y=5 31.0% 100.0% 42.9% 42.9% 54.0% 60.0% 63.7% 48.3%
Notes: The table compares the estimated choice probability with the actual observed probability ny|x/nx.
In order to formally establish the difference between w2∗ and w1∗, we present next the 95%
confidence intervals of the estimates. It is clear from Table 4 that the estimated w2∗ and w1∗
have no overlap in the 95% confidence intervals of either model. Therefore, the null hypothesis is
rejected and w2 > w1. Thus, the recovered model weights from the observed subject behaviors,
indeed depend on the order of play.
Table 4: Confidence Intervals of the Estimated Weights
Estimated Weights Coefficients C. I.
w2∗ 0.353 [0.250, 0.457]
w1∗MODEL 1 0.119 [0.093, 0.144]
w1∗MODEL 2 0.018 [-0.008, 0.044]
Notes: The table reports the confidence intervals of the parameters at the 95% level.
Preferences refer to stable characteristics of subjects. Such characteristics need to be im-
mune to the order of play. Preferences are unobserved, thus can only be recovered via subjects’
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observed choice of actions (behavior). To estimate subjects’ preferences, we need to assume
that the observed behavior is consistent with subjects’ utility maximization under a Nash equi-
librium framework, and the utility function specification is suitable to capture preferences. In
estimation, we find that the recovered utility parameters are different; that is, w2 > w1 for
both specifications of the utility function. One simple explanation of the observed difference in
weights is that subjects’ preferences are conditional on the order of play. However, this is in
direct contradiction with the defining criterion of preferences. On the other hand, a plausible
explanation rests on the strategic considerations that affect subjects’ behaviors. Such strate-
gic considerations may depend upon the position of the node in the game-tree. In this case,
the detected weight difference w2 − w1 is reflecting conditional behaviors rather than social
preferences.
5 Conclusion
We studied the behavior of subjects in an experimental Trust game and estimated their pref-
erences. We test the model under the Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE), which maintains
that first mover beliefs are consistent with the observed probability distribution. On the other
hand, second mover behavior is extrapolated without any a priori rationality assumptions. In
particular, we estimate the parameters of a piecewise linear utility function where each agent
is assumed to maximize the weighted sum of his own payoff and the payoff of his partner. Our
model is commonly used in the literature to describe agents’ social preferences.
Our results indicate that the estimated weight placed on the payoff of a subject’s partner
depends significantly on the position that the subject occupies in the game. More specifically,
second movers attach significantly higher weight to the payoff of first movers than the weight
first movers attach to the payoff of second movers. But a preference is, by definition, a stable
characteristic of an individual and therefore should not significantly depend upon environmental
conditions such as the position of the subject in the game. This finding puts in question the
usefulness of social preferences in interpreting behavior.
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